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Abstract 
A simulation model of international tourist flows is used to estimate the impact of a carbon 
tax on aviation fuel. The effect of the tax on travel behaviour is small: A global $1000/tC 
would change travel behaviour to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from international aviation 
by 0.8%. This is because the imposed tax is probably small relative to the air fare. A $1000/tC 
tax would less than double air fares, and have a smaller impact on the total cost of the holiday. 
In addition, the price elasticity is low. A carbon tax on aviation fuel would particularly affect 
long-haul flights, because of high emissions, and short-haul flights, because of the emission 
during take-off and landing. Medium distance flights would be affected least. This implies 
that tourist destinations that rely heavily on short-haul flights (that is, islands near continents, 
such as Ireland) or on intercontinental flights (e.g., Africa) will see a decline in international 
tourism numbers, while other destinations may see international arrivals rise. If the tax is only 
applied to the European Union, EU tourists would stay closer to home so that EU tourism 
would grow at the expense of other destinations. Sensitivity analyses reveal that the 
qualitative insights are robust. A carbon tax on aviation fuel would have little effect on 
international tourism, and little effect on emissions. 
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1. Introduction 
Transport is responsible for a large portion of carbon dioxide emissions, and its emissions are 
growing faster than those from other sources.1 Moreover, emission reduction appears to be 
more difficult and more expensive in transport than it is in other sectors, particularly power 
                                                 
1 See Greening (2004), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/co2_human.html, and 
http://themes.eea.europa.eu/Environmental_issues/climate/indicators. 
generation (Barker et al., 2001; Schaefer and Jacoby, 2005; Van Vuuren et al., 2006). 
International aviation is the fastest growing part of transport and it is more difficult to regulate 
than domestic transport, inter alia because it is outside the jurisdiction of a single country. 
Should abatement be successful for power generation and domestic transport, the increasing 
emissions from international aviation would stand out (Pridmore et al., 2003) and pressure to 
reduce emissions would increase. This paper investigates the potential contribution of 
emission reduction from international aviation. 
The paper starts with the heroic assumption that at least a group of countries will be able to 
agree on a tax on kerosene. I will not analyse the chance of this occurring, or which countries 
would be likely to take the initiative. It should be noted the European Union, particularly at 
the initiative of France, used to promote the idea of a kerosene tax,2 but recently the political 
attention has shifted to including aviation in the European Trading System for carbon dioxide 
permits.3 In this paper, I assume that there is a tax. Tradable permits would raise the price just 
as a tax would (Tietenberg, 2001). 
The paper is limited to international aviation demand by tourists. Domestic air travel is 
excluded, as is travel for business purposes.4 The short reason is that the paper is based on an 
existing model that includes neither domestic travel nor business travel. The reason that the 
model excludes these aspects is that there is a global database of reasonable quality on 
international tourist travel – but there is nothing of the sort for domestic tourist travel or for 
business travel.5 So, a choice has to be made between comprehensiveness in a geographic 
sense, and comprehensiveness in a travel sense. The current paper opts for the former, which 
of course does not make the latter less relevant. Note that business travellers are less likely to 
respond to price changes than are tourists. 
The paper is limited to shifts in demand induced by a kerosene tax. Of course, a kerosene tax 
would also induce changes in flight behaviour, aircraft technology, and perhaps fuel choice – 
each of which would reduce carbon dioxide emissions (Wit et al., 2002). However, this would 
dampen the price signal to the traveller. The results suggest that this is not a major problem. 
Note that other studies focus on technical measures that would reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions (Bates et al., 2000; Wit et al., 2002, 2005; Wulff and Hourmouziadis, 1997). 
I was able to find only three previous studies that estimate the effect of carbon pricing on 
international aviation. In a report to CEC DG Energy and Transport, Wit et al. (2002) find 
that a €50/tCO2 would reduce air travel demand such that emissions fall by 4.9%.6 This is 
almost entirely due to a loss in total travel demand – modal shift is minimal. Unfortunately, 
Wit et al. (2002) do not state how they got to this estimate.7 The results are from “the AERO 
model”, but the report does not detail the model, while the reference list does give any 
specific information as to where a model description can be found. There is no reference to 
the AERO model on the website of the alleged model developer, the Netherlands Civil 
Aviation Authority. It is hard to imagine that many passengers would be deterred by a 
€50/tCO2 carbon tax. According to Wit et al. (2002), this is equivalent to up to €9 charge per 
round-trip. 
Olsthoorn (2001) also uses a linear model. Regressing jet-fuel bunker (a good proxy for the 
fuel used in international aviation) on world GDP and the price of oil, he finds that fuel 
                                                 
2 See http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/eu-kerosene-tax-fight-global-poverty/article-135109. 
3 See http://www.euractiv.com/en/sustainability/aviation-climate-change/article-139728. 
4 Note that business travel is combined with tourism travel for some countries. 
5 Although this information can be had for selected countries. 
6 For a €10/tCO2 tax, emissions drop 1.0%; for €30/tCO2 tax, 3.1%. Travel demand appears to be linear in price. 
7 Wit et al. (2005) revise the estimates of Wit and Dings (2002). However, they only comment on the CO2 
emission reduction due to technological change. The 2002 estimates are 3 times as high as the 2005 estimates. 
demand falls by 4 PJ for every $1 added to the oil price. He imposes a draconian tax of 
$1500/tCO2, and reduces aviation emissions by up to 90%. 
Michaelis (1997) uses price elasticities of –0.7 and –2.1 (after Oum et al., 1990) and finds that 
a $125/tC tax would increase ticket prices by 7% on average, and reduce demand by 4.4% to 
13.3%. Like Wit et al. (2002), Michaelis (1997) argues that travel demand falls rather than 
shifts to other modes. Acutt and Dodgson (1996) indeed report very low cross-elasticities for 
the various modes of travel. 
Wohlgemuth (1997) has price elasticities that are notably lower than those used by Michaelis 
(1997): -0.39 (-0.39) for the USA, -0.09 (-0.04) for Europe and –0.03 (-0.02) for Japan for the 
long-term (short-term). For developing countries, he assumes a price elasticity of –0.15 with 
respect to the price of crude oil. In their survey of the tourism demand literature, Witt and 
Witt (1995) find a range of travel cost elasticities of –0.04 to –4.34, with a median estimate of 
–0.50. In his meta-analysis of the tourism literature, Crouch (1995) finds a central estimates of 
the travel cost elasticity of –0.85, with a standard deviation of 1.15; the underlying estimates 
range from 0.11 to –1.89. Morley (1998) estimates a range of fare elasticities of –0.04 to –
2.80 for travellers to Australia. Garin-Munoz (2006) estimates crude oil price elasticities of –
0.12 to –0.15 in the short run, and –0.22 to –0.41 in the long run for visitors to the Canary 
Islands. For German visitors to Spain, Garin-Munoz (2007) estimates short-term elasticities of 
–0.24 to –0.33, and long-term elasticities of –0.52 to –0.67. This suggests that Michaelis’ 
(1997) lower estimate is more valid. The elasticities used in this paper are in the same range. 
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 presents the models. Section 3 discusses the first 
results. As many parameters are uncertain yet important, Section 4 shows a number of 
sensitivity analyses. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
The Hamburg Tourism Model (HTM) describes, at a reasonable level of geographic 
disaggregation, the reactions of tourists to climate change and climate policy (Hamilton et al., 
2005a,b; Bigano et al., 2005). Here, attention is limited to climate policy. The model 
computations have four steps. First, total holiday demand is determined. Then, the fraction of 
domestic and foreign holidays is set. Third, the destination of holidays abroad is chosen. 
Fourth, total tourist numbers per country, average length of stay, and total expenditures are 
computed. A tax on aviation fuel in international travel would primarily affect the third model 
stage. 
 
2.1. Data and interpolation 
A simulation model is driven by data. Data on international arrivals and departures for 1995 
are taken from the World Resources Databases (http://earthtrends.wri.org). There are two 
major problems with this dataset. Firstly, for some countries, the reported data are arrivals and 
departures for tourism only. For other countries, the data are arrivals and departures for all 
purposes. Unfortunately, it is impossible to correct for this. Secondly, there are missing 
observations, particularly with regard to departures. 
For arrivals, 181 countries have data but 26 do not. We filled the missing observations with a 
statistical model, viz., 
(1)  
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where A denotes total arrivals, G is land area (in square kilometres); T is annual average 
temperature for 1961-1990 (in degrees Celsius) averaged over the country, C is length of 
coastline (in kilometres), and Y is per capita income. d indexes the country of destination. 
This model is the best fit to the observations for the countries for which we do have data. The 
total number of tourists increases from 55.2 million (observed) to 56.5 million (observed + 
modelled). The 26 missing observations constitute only 2% of the international tourism 
market. 
For departures, the data problem is more serious: 107 countries report but 99 do not; 46.5 
million departures are reported, against 56.5 million arrivals, so that 18% of all international 
tourists have an unknown origin. We filled the missing observations with a statistical model, 
viz.,  
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where D denotes departures (in number), P denotes population (in thousands) and B is the 
number of countries with shared land borders. o indexes the country of origin. This model is 
the best fit to the observations for the countries for which we do have data. This leads to a 
total number of departures of 48.2 million, so we scaled up all departures by 17% so that the 
total number of observed and modelled departures equals the total number of observed and 
modelled arrivals. 
For most countries, the volume of domestic tourist flows is derived using 1997 data contained 
in the Euromonitor (2002) database. For some other countries, we rely upon alternative 
sources, such as national statistical offices, other governmental institutions or trade 
associations; see Bigano et al. (2005). Data are mostly in the form of number of trips to 
destinations beyond a non-negligible distance from the place of residence, and involve at least 
one overnight stay. For some countries, data in this format were not available, and we resorted 
to either the number of registered guests in hotels, campsites, hostels etc., or the ratio between 
the number of overnight stays and the average length of stay. The latter formats underestimate 
domestic tourism by excluding trips to friends and relatives; nevertheless, we included such 
data for completeness, relying on the fact that dropping them did not lead to any dramatic 
change. 
We filled the missing observations using two regressions. We interpolated total tourist 
numbers, D+H, where H is the number of domestic tourists, using 
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Note that people may take a holiday more than once a year. As we measure population 
numbers in thousands, the parameters imply that people with an income of $10,000 per person 
per year take one holiday per year. 
The ratio of domestic to total holidays was interpolated using 
(4) ( )
1 1 1
1.19 0.42 0.30 0.32 1.11
7
0.12 1.24
2
ln 3.75 0.83 10 ln 0.93 10 ln 0.16 10 0.29 10
0.16 4.43 10 ln
63; 0.36
o
o o o
o o
o o
adj
H G C T
D H
Y Y
N R
− − −
−
= − + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅+
+ − ⋅
= =
3 2
oT
−
8 iSα
 
The individual temperature parameters are not statistically significant from zero at the 5% 
level, but they are jointly significant. “Observations” for 1995 were derived from 1997 
observations by dividing the latter by the population and per capita income growth between 
1995 and 1997, correcting the latter for the income elasticity of (3) and (4). The income 
elasticity of domestic holidays is positive for countries with low incomes but falls as income 
grows and eventually goes negative. Qualitatively, this pattern is not surprising. In very poor 
countries, only the upper income class have holidays and they prefer to travel abroad, also 
because domestic holidays may be expensive too. As a country gets richer, the middle income 
class have holidays too, and they first prefer cheap, domestic holidays. The share of domestic 
in total holidays only starts to fall if the lower income class are rich enough to afford a 
holiday abroad; with the estimates of Equation (4), this happens if average income exceeds 
$360,000, a high number. 
For the total (domestic and foreign) number of tourists, the world total is 12.0% higher if we 
include the interpolated tourist numbers, that is, 4.0 billion versus 3.6 billion tourists. The 
observed world total includes those countries for which we have observed both domestic 
tourists and international arrivals. For domestic tourists only, the observations add up to 3.1 
billion tourists, and 3.5 billion tourists with interpolation, a 12.1% increase. 
For international tourism, we also need the matrix of bilateral flows of tourists from one 
country to the next. That matrix is largely unobserved. In order to build this matrix, we take 
Equation (1), multiply it with the distance (in kilometres) between the capital cities raised to 
the distance elasticity, and allocate the tourists from a particular country to all other countries 
proportional to the result. This procedure delivers the results for the base year 1995. 
For other years, we use a similar approach. The total number of tourists per country follows 
from Equation (3). This is divided into domestic and international tourists using Equation (4), 
holding everything constant except for temperature and per capita income. For the simulation 
years, we allocate international departures in the same way as we build the matrix of bilateral 
tourist flows, keeping everything as in 1995 except for per capita income and temperature. 
 
2.2. Extrapolation 
In previous versions of the model, the equations for interpolation are also used for 
extrapolation. HTM, version 1.3, deviates from this practice. The reason is that new data and 
new results have become available. Particularly, the study of Bigano et al. (2006) sheds new 
light on preferences for holiday destinations. See Table A1. Data for the 1970s can be found 
in Senior (1982) and OECD (1989), sources that were previously overlooked. These data 
provide the opportunity to improve the calibration of the dynamic features of HTM. 
Bigano et al. (2006) estimate holiday destination choice models for 45 countries for the year 
1999: 
(5)  21 2 3 4 5 6 7ln( ) ln( ) ln( )i i
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where Aii denotes the arrivals in country i from country j; Dij is the great-circle distance 
between the two countries; yi is per capita income in the destination country; Ti is the annual 
average temperature in the destination country; Hi is the number of world heritage sites per 
million square kilometers in the destination country; Ci is the length of the coast line of the 
destination country; Ai is the land area of the destination country; and Si is an index of the 
political stability of the destination country. 
OECD (1989) has data on domestic and foreign holidays, for some countries as far back as 
1972. Combined with the data of Bigano et al. (2005), this gives a reasonable time series. We 
regressed the natural logarithm of the ratio of domestic to total holidays on the natural 
logarithm of per capita income. Table A2 has the results. The mean income elasticity is –0.10 
(0.01). This is used in the base case. We use the temperature sensitivity of (2), which implies 
that the domestic-to-international ratio is at a maximum at 18°C. Note that the ratio of 
Equation (4) is not necessarily smaller than unity; we restrict the ratio of domestic to total 
tourists to lie between 0.01 and 0.99.  
According to Equation (5), international tourists prefer to stay closer to home, as this reduces 
travel cost and travel time. Bigano et al. (2006) find that the distance elasticity is closer to 
zero – that is, distance matters less – if people get richer. Re-estimating that relationship 
including the 1979 data (Senior, 1982), we get: 
(6)  1 (1.34) (0.14)7.56 0.68ln
j
jyα = − +
For an income of $23,000 (as in the UK in 2002), for instance, the distance elasticity is –0.73. 
This is towards the lower end of the range in Oum et al. (1990). 
 
2.3. Travel costs 
Equation (5) has distance, but tourists are deterred by the cost and duration of travel. 
However, at an aggregate scale, data on travel cost and travel time are impossible to get. 
Indeed, it is even difficult to get such data at a micro-level (Maddison, 2001; Hamilton, 2002; 
Lise and Tol, 2003). As an approximation, we collected travel time and cost for flights from 
London to the capitals of the world. Only direct flights were included. The cost was the 
cheapest offer on www.expedia.com, for a flight two months in the future, including a 
weekend at destination. Travel time correlates very well with distance. One needs 47 minutes 
for take-off and landing (on paper), and needs 4 seconds per kilometre (875 km/hr). The R2 is 
99.5%. The data on travel cost is noisier. On average, one pays $30 to get in the plane, and 14 
cents per kilometre. The R2 is only 70.0%. We use these two linear equations to derive travel 
time and travel cost from the distances that were in the previous versions of the model. 
The previous model version had an income-dependent distance elasticity. See (5) and (6). 
Travel time and travel cost elasticities are derived as follows. The time and price elasticities 
are arbitrarily assumed to have the same value (-0.45) for UK citizens. The value is chosen 
such that the travel patterns of the British based on time and cost closely mimics that based on 
distance, based on least squares. The time elasticity is assumed to be constant, but the price 
elasticity varies with income. It is calibrated so that the travel behaviour for the time and cost 
model is close (least squares) to that for the distance model for people with an income one-
tenth of the UK average. The cost elasticity then equals –1.50 +0.14lny. This is obviously 
crude – sensitivity analyses are reported below. 
 
2.4. Emissions 
Pearce and Pearce (2000) report carbon dioxide emissions per type of plane and length of trip, 
and such emissions can also be computed from the data presented in Wit et al. (2002). Take-
off and landing are energy-intensive compared to cruising, so short trips emit more carbon per 
kilometre than do long trips. The average plane of Pearce and Pearce (2000) emits about the 
same as the average plane of Wit et al. (2002). We transformed emissions per plane (from 
Pearce and Pearce, 2000) to emissions per passenger using the higher occupancy rates of Wit 
et al. (2002). This implies 6.5 kg C per passenger for take-off and landing, and 0.02 kg per 
passenger-kilometre. The resulting carbon dioxide emissions per trip are very similar to those 
found on www.climatecare.org, the site at which one can buy emission offsets. 
Total emissions follow from multiplying emissions per passenger-kilometre by the number of 
passenger-kilometres. We assume that no holidays at less than 500 km distance (one way) are 
by air, and that all holidays beyond 5000 km are by air; in between the fraction increases 
linearly with distance. For island nations, the respective distance are 0 and 500 km. Total 
emissions in 2000 are 140 million metric tonnes of carbon, which is 2.1% of total emissions 
from fossil fuels. This is from tourism only. Total international aviation is reckoned to be 
responsible for some 3% of global emissions. There are no published numbers on the share of 
tourism in total international travel. The modelled emissions are not completely off, but may 
be a bit high. 
 
2.5. Validation 
HTM is a static model. There are no differential equations in the model. This implies that the 
model can be run backwards in time, as well as forwards. In the next section, we consider the 
future. For validation purposes, the model was run for the period 1980-1995. Figure A1 shows 
modelled and observed international arrivals for 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995. The model 
reproduces the data very well; the R2 is at least 90%. Figure A2 shows modelled and observed 
international arrivals. The model fit is less impressive, but does not fall below 73%. Figure 
A3 shows the ratio of domestic to total holidays for 1980 and 1995; there are no 
comprehensive data available for intermediate years. The model fit is impressive for the 
calibration year (it’d better), but for 1980, the R2 is only 64%. A glance at Table A2 shows the 
reason. Different countries have had different trends in the structure of their holidays, while 
the model uses a common trend for all. Nonetheless, Figures A1-3 offer some level of 
confidence in the model results. 
 
3. Results 
In the base case, the effect of a kerosene tax on international tourist travel is investigated for 
the year 2010 for three alternative taxes: $10/tC, $100/tC and $1000/tC,8 using the parameters 
as described above. The tax is applied at global level, for the Annex 1 countries, for the 
countries of the European Union and its affiliates, and for the European Union only. 
Figure 1 shows the change in the world total of passenger kilometres, and the change in total 
carbon emissions if the tax is applied globally. For a $1000/tC kerosene tax, international 
tourism travel falls by about 0.8% and the associated carbon dioxide emissions fall by 0.9%. 
There are a number of reasons for the result on emissions. Firstly, the number of travellers 
stays the same. Secondly, although shorter trips are generally favoured over longer ones, if 
there is little alternative to flying, medium distance trips actually become more attractive 
relative to short trips. Thirdly, the price elasticity is assumed to be low. Fourthly, the price 
change is low: $73 for a 1,000 km roundtrip, for example. This is less than a doubling of the 
air fare, even for a very high tax. 
                                                 
8 In the European Trading System, carbon permits trade at some $40/tC. The marginal damage cost of carbon 
dioxide is probably less than $50/tC (Tol, 2005). See Schipper et al. (2001) for an estimate of the total 
environmental costs of aviation. 
The difference between the change in travel distance and the change in carbon dioxide 
emissions is due to a shift from air travel to others modes on the one hand, and to the large 
emissions of take-off and landing on the other hand. 
The relative importance of these factors can only be investigated with a sensitivity analysis, 
reported below. 
Figure 2 shows the change in the number of international arrivals for the countries that are 
most affected in an absolute sense (Hong Kong, United Kingdom) and in a relative sense 
(Cyprus, South Korea). Results are also shown for Ireland. Hong Kong and South Korea 
benefit from the shift in demand from tourists from Japan and China, to which they are close, 
as well as from a shift general East and Southeast Asian shift away from destinations in 
Europe and North America. Cyprus, Ireland and the United Kingdom suffer from being on the 
fringe of Europe as well as being island nations. 
Figure 3 shows a world map with winners and losers. The Americas and Africa generally lose, 
because of the large share of intercontinental visitors in the case without a kerosene tax. 
Western Europe loses too. Central and Eastern Europe gain – from each other’s custom but 
also from redirect Scandinavian and British travel. Interestingly, the countries that neighbour 
China and India all gain – a sign of the growing importance of these two countries in 
international tourism. 
Above, the kerosene tax is global. This is unlikely. As an alternative, the tax is applied to the 
Annex I countries, the European Union plus its affiliates, and the European Union only. The 
tax is implemented as a departure fee, covering the entire one-way flight.9 As all trips are 
assumed to be roundtrips, it does not matter whether it is a departure fee or a landing fee.10 
The landing fee is paid twice on flights from an Annex 1 country to another Annex 1 country, 
once on flights from or to an Annex 1 country, and not on flights from and to an non-Annex I 
country. 
The $1000/tC global kerosene tax reduces carbon dioxide emissions in 2010 by 0.81% of the 
projected 2010 emissions without a tax. If applied to Annex 1 countries only, this falls to 
0.40%; for the EU plus, this is 0.21%; for the EU, 0.19%. As Europe has such a large share of 
international tourist travel, this is as expected. 
Figure 4 shows the effect on travel patterns. An EU tax would divert European travellers from 
the USA, Africa, and the Middle East to Europe. The Americas would benefit from a US 
citizens not travelling to Europe. South Asia, East Asia, and Australasia would benefit from 
tourists diverted from Europe. Iceland, Ireland and the UK lose market share because they are 
heavily dependent on airborne tourists. Norway, and Switzerland, even though exempt from 
the tax, lose market share, Norway because it is relatively remote, Switzerland because it is 
central and therefore sees a relatively high price increase. Figure 4 also displays the difference 
between the global tax and the EU. The EU would obviously lose a share of the market in 
international tourism, but so would countries that disproportionally rely on European visitors, 
such as Pakistan, South Korea and Japan. The rest of the world, including Norway and 
Switzerland, would gain. 
 
4. Sensitivity analyses 
                                                 
9 One may question the legality of taxing emissions in another country’s airspace, as this may violate the 
Chicago Convention. On the other hand, the atmosphere is the common property of mankind. 
10 A departure (landing) fee would be an export (import) tax based on the carbon-content of the flight service. 
Export taxes are easier to defend under WTO rules than are import taxes. 
There are a large number of parameters in HTM. All of them are uncertain and affect the 
impact of kerosene taxation on carbon dioxide emissions; yet, some are more uncertain than 
others, and some have a greater effect. I here limit myself to the most important parameters. 
The parameters that govern the modal choice for international tourist travel are my guess, 
based on some travel experience and casual observations. If aviation has a larger (smaller) 
share of international tourism travel, then total emissions rise (fall). The most important 
parameter is the distance above which 100% of travel is by aeroplane. If this were twice the 
base value, emissions would be 14% lower. Emission reduction responds with the opposite 
sign: If aviation has a larger (smaller) share of international tourism travel, then emission 
reduction are smaller (larger) for the same carbon tax. This is because modal shift is more 
(less) effective. However, if the distance below which no travel is by air is raised, this pattern 
is broken. This is because many more destinations are within a 1000 km reach than with a 500 
km reach. The carbon tax would then have a greater impact on destination choice. If modal 
choice were endogenous rather than driven by a set of fixed parameters, then the effect of a 
carbon tax would be larger as tourists would switch travel mode as well as destination to 
reduce their travel costs. 
If all international tourist travel were by plane, carbon dioxide emissions were more than 
twice as high (Table 1). In this case, a $1000/tC would increase emissions. This is because 
tourists are assumed to make their destination choice based on the relative attractiveness of 
destinations. Because of the high emissions of take-off and landing, nearby destinations face a 
greater relative price increase than destinations that are further afield – so that tourists travel 
farther and emit more. This implies that, in the base case, emission reductions are achieved by 
combination of shorter travel and model shift. 
Table 1 also shows the case in which the carbon tax is proportional to the distance travelled. 
Technically, carbon emissions from take-off and landing are set to zero; and per-kilometre 
emissions are re-calibrated so that global emissions are as in the base case. Under this 
assumption, short trips are not disadvantaged relative to medium-distance trips. Indeed, 
emissions fall further than in the base case, by 0.95% for a $1000/tC tax. 
The price elasticity is obviously important. It is also very uncertain. The survey of Oum et al. 
(1980) reveals a wide range of estimates. The price elasticity used here is a result of 
calibration rather than estimation. In the calibration, it is assumed that, for the UK, the travel 
cost elasticity and the travel time elasticity have the same value. This is arbitrary. The model 
was recalibrated so that the price elasticity equals two times and four times the time elasticity. 
The price elasticity then increases from 0.45 (base case) to 0.58 (twice) and 0.68 (four times) 
for a country with the average income of the UK.11 For a country with an average income 
one-tenth of the UK, the price elasticities are 0.88, 0.95, and 1.01. 
Table 1 shows the results. Recalibration has little impact on total carbon dioxide emissions in 
the case without a kerosene tax. There is also little effect on travel patterns (results not 
shown). Figure 1 shows that, as expected, the higher the price elasticity, the stronger the 
emission reduction for any given kerosene tax. Table 1 shows that emission reduction more 
than doubles for the very high price elasticity compared to the base case. Still, a $1000/tC 
would cut emissions by 1.7% only. 
Recall that the price elasticity only covers substitution between international destinations – all 
of which face a price increase. Total demand for international travel is not affected by the 
kerosene tax, at least in the base case. In order to test the sensitivity of this assumption, the 
                                                 
11 Note that the studies in Oum et al. (1980) typically do not include travel time. This implies an upward bias in 
the price elasticity. Note also that tourists are likely to judge a holiday on its total cost, another reason why the 
price elasticity of a single holiday component is limited. 
average travel cost of international tourism with and without tax is computed and, with the 
price elasticity of the base case, used to reduce the demand for international holidays; 
domestic holidays are the substitute. This is probably an overestimate, as a tourist may well 
compare the total costs of foreign and domestic holidays, and a foreign holiday may be 
considered as a status good. At the same time, the base case allows for no substitution at all, a 
sure underestimate. Figure 1 and Table 1 show the results. The effect is large: a €1000/tC tax 
would cut emissions by 7.6%, eight times larger than in the base case. However, this is a very 
large tax, while emission reduction is still small. For a €10/tC tax, emissions fall by 0.1%; for 
a €100/tC tax, emissions fall by 0.9%. 
Besides carbon dioxide, planes also emit nitrogen oxides and water vapour. Both contribute to 
warming, but the effect is regional and situation-specific. An equivalence to CO2 has therefore 
not been established (Ramaswamy et al., 2001). A uniform, global tax would be an 
inappropriate instrument. Therefore, no formal sensitivity analysis was performed. However, 
the consequences can be gleaned from the above. Compared to CO2, emissions of NOx are 
even more concentrated during start and landing. An NOx tax would imply that short-haul 
flights are hit extra hard. For water vapour, the opposite is true. Cruising is more important 
than take-off and landing. Williams and Noland (2006) suggest that water vapour emissions 
may be ten times as important as carbon dioxide emissions. If that is true, a $1000/tC tax is 
conceivable. 
The model omits behavioural and technical measures for reducing carbon dioxide emissions, 
such as changes in taxiing, take-off and landing; changing in aircraft occupancy; upgraded 
engines; and the use of light-weight materials. As traveller behaviour is not very responsive to 
the limited price signals that carbon taxation would bring about, behavioural and technical 
change may contribute more to emission reduction. If such measures would be implemented 
rationally, air fares would rise less. This would further limit the response of travellers. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper presents estimates of the impact of a kerosene tax on international tourism. A 
kerosene tax disproportionally increases the price of short flights, because take-off and 
landing are very energy-intensive. A kerosene tax would induce a shift from long flights to 
medium distance one, a shift from medium distance flights to short distance car and train 
holidays, and a shift from short flights to medium distance ones. Island nations would be 
disproportionally hurt by a kerosene tax. If the tax is applied regionally rather than globally, 
then the taxed region looses market share to the non-taxed region. Emissions would fall only 
by a small amount, even if the kerosene tax is very high. This is because a kerosene tax would 
raise the cost of flying by only a limited amount. To put this differently, very high kerosene 
taxes would be need to substantially reduce carbon dioxide emissions from international 
aviation. Emission reduction can be had elsewhere for much less money. 
There are a number of caveats to these results. The model does not allow for technical 
measures to reduce emissions. This implies that emission reductions are underestimated. It 
also implies that the estimate travel response is overestimated. The model does not allow for 
substitution between domestic and international holidays, or indeed between holidays and no 
holidays. As the estimated effect on international travel is only small, this is probably not a 
major shortcoming. Similarly, the model does not allow for explicit modal shifts – although 
modal shift is implicit. The sign of the introduced bias is unknown. Furthermore, the results 
depend to a large extent on the assumed travel price elasticity of tourism demand – and on the 
assumed travel costs. Both are uncertain. The model does not differentiate between regular 
and discount airlines, again for want of data. Discount airlines would face the same kerosene 
taxes, and therefore experience a higher relative price increase. Finally, the model ignores 
emissions of water vapour. 
The implications of the results, notwithstanding the above caveats, are as follows. The shifts 
in tourist flows are small if kerosene is taxed at the levels currently being discussed for the 
appropriate price of carbon (up to $100/tC). Even though an island nation such as Cyprus or 
Ireland would be disproportionally hurt, the effect is too small to warrant strong opposition. 
Similarly, the airline industry has little ground for opposition. Although the revenue of the 
kerosene tax would be high, most of the cost would be passed on to the travellers, who would 
hardly change behaviour. If the kerosene is not taxed, but subject to emissions trading; and the 
permits are grandfathered but the costs is passed on to customers nonetheless; then the airlines 
would actually benefit. However, a kerosene tax is unlikely to substantially reduce emissions 
– because the tax is low compared to the air fare, and because the price elasticity is small. 
These two reasons are model independent. 
A kerosene tax may of course induce technological and behavioural change. If so, that would 
be good. If not, the impact is limited. It is not clear, however, whether a tax is the best way to 
bring about such change. Some aspects of emission reduction are under control of the airlines, 
such as the type and size of the aircraft and its engines. Airlines can influence the number of 
passengers on board. Airlines already work hard to keep the costs per passenger to its 
minimum. Flight routes, landing and take-off, and taxiing are the remit of air control and the 
airport, however. A tax would not affect them. This suggests that a mix of instruments would 
be needed, or perhaps that flight emissions should be partly attributed to flight control and 
airports. 
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Table 1. Carbon dioxide emissions from international tourism aviation and emission reduction 
for alternative parameterisation of travel mode choice. 
 Emissions Difference Reduction Difference 
 106 tC % % % 
Base case 140  0.81  
Max = 2500 148 5.6 0.31 -61.6 
Max = 10000 121 -13.5 1.36 67.5 
Min = 250 139 -0.5 0.85 4.6 
Min = 1000 141 0.6 0.82 1.2 
Island = 250 140 0.1 0.81 -1.0 
Island = 1000 140 -0.2 0.83 2.0 
No modal shift 308 119.7 -0.06 -107.7 
Proportional to distance 140 -0.1 0.95 17.2 
High price elasticity 140 0.2 1.30 59.8 
Very high price elasticity 140 0.3 1.67 105.5 
Domestic substitution 140 0.0 7.59 833.3 
 Note: In the base case, all trips longer than 5000 km (max) are by aeroplane and no trips 
shorter than 500 km (min). For island nations, min = 0 and max = 500. For “no modal shift”, 
all distance parameters equal nought.
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Figure 1. The effect of a kerosene tax on the world total passenger-kilometres (top panel) and 
the world total carbon dioxide emissions (bottom panel) for international tourism.
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Figure 2. The effect of a kerosene tax on international arrivals in selected countries; changes 
relative to baseline (top panel) and in absolute numbers (bottom panel).
  
Figure 3. The effect of a global, $1000/tC kerosene tax on international tourist arrivals in 
2010 in absolute numbers (top panel) and in percent of the case without a tax (bottom panel). 
  
Figure 4. The difference in international tourism numbers in 2010 between the case without a 
tax and a $1000/tC kerosene in the EU (top panel) and between a global and an EU tax 
(bottom panel).
Table A1. Optimal holiday temperature for tourists from selected countries in 1979 and 1999; 
standard deviations are in brackets. 
 1979 1999 Difference 
Australia 15.28 (2.12) 14.64 (0.93) -0.64 (2.31)
Belgium 14.91 (2.99)    
Canada 14.41 (1.30) 18.71 (1.65) 4.30 (2.10)
France 15.95 (2.53) 18.66 (2.82) 2.71 (3.79)
Germany 13.25 (1.73) 18.84 (5.63) 5.59 (5.89)
Italy 16.08 (1.99) 18.45 (2.55) 2.37 (3.23)
Japan 16.64 (3.52) 17.37 (1.26) 0.74 (3.74)
Netherlands 13.65 (1.94) 15.62 (1.82) 1.97 (2.66)
New Zealand 16.96 (3.04) 14.26 (1.12) -2.70 (3.24)
Spain 15.94 (1.97) 16.65 (1.63) 0.72 (2.55)
Switzerland 17.08 (3.73) 15.09 (1.16) -1.99 (3.90)
UK 14.13 (1.50) 18.08 (1.82) 3.95 (2.35)
USA 13.21 (1.62) 17.60 (2.18) 4.39 (2.71)
Table A2. Income elasticity of domestic to total holidays. 
Country Elasticity 
Australia -0.0670 (0.0091) 
Austria -0.6799 (0.1623) 
Belgium -0.2235 (0.3888) 
Canada 0.8128 (0.3932) 
Denmark -0.7022 (0.2394) 
Finland -0.1429 (0.2799) 
France -0.3257 (0.0542) 
Germany 0.7153 (0.3121) 
Iceland -0.2784 (0.1301) 
Ireland -0.3285 (0.0642) 
Japan -0.1756 (0.0398) 
Netherlands 0.4200 (0.2534) 
Norway -0.4945 (0.1467) 
Portugal -0.6019 (0.0767) 
Spain -0.7181 (0.0623) 
Sweden 1.7842 (0.8042) 
Switzerland -2.1831 (0.9930) 
UK -0.1404 (0.1487) 
USA 0.0395 (0.0428) 
average -0.0996 (0.0083) 
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Figure A1. International tourist arrivals as observed and as modelled in 1980, 1985, 1990 and 
1995 (from left to right and from top to bottom). 
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Figure A2. International tourist departures as observed and as modelled in 1980, 1985, 1990 
and 1995 (from left to right and from top to bottom). 
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Figure A3. The percentage of domestic in all holidays as observed and as modelled in 1980 
(left panel) and 1995 (right). 
